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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This reply brief is limited to a response by Appel-
lants to new matter contained in Respondent's Brief, -
namely, Respondent's reference to and discussion of an 
opinion of the Attorney General dated July 26, 1968, 
and its relation to the later opinion of August 15, 1968, 
which later opinion f.ormed the basis for the Bank 
Commissioner's decision denying Respondent's appli-
cation for the South Ogden branch. The opinion of 
July 26, 1968, is set out in the Appendix to Re'Spond-
ent's brief, and the opm1on of August 13, 19G8, is set 
out in the Appendix to Appellants' brief. 
Appellants did not discuss or ref er to this earlier 
opinion in their initial brief for two reasons. First, be-
cause they did not consider it relevant, as it did not 
form the basis of the Commissioner's decision, nor 
was it even mentioned or referred to by him. A_lld sec-
ond, for the reason that it is not believed to be a part 
of the record before the lower court, nor a part of the 
record on this appeal. However, we certainly have no 
objection to this Court reviewing and considering the 
earlier opinion, and, since Respondent has now brought 
it before the court and argued its significance, we now 
make this brief response. 
ARGUMENT 
The Opinion of the Attorney General of July 
26, 1968, confirms that the ultimate Decision of 
the Bank Commi,ssioner in Denying the Appli-
cation for the South Ogden Branch Was Not Con-
trary to Law. 
The essence of Appellants' position on this appeal 
has been and is that the primary question before this 
couut, as it was before the lower court, is whether 
the decision of the Bank Commissioner in denying Re-
spondent's application for a South Ogden branch was 
a decision that was "contrary to law"; that is, a decis-
ion the Commisioner could not lawfully make in the 
light of the evidence he had before him. 
As we have suggested in our initial brief, if the 
opinion of the Attorney General of August 15, 1968, is 
legally sound, that is an end of the matter and this case 
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of necessity concludes in Appellant's favor, as the Com-
missioner's decision then was obviously not contrary 
to law. On the other hand, if the Opinion of August 
15, 1968, is determined to be not legally sound, the case 
is not thereby concluded in Respondent's favor, because 
snch a determination in no wise reaches the ultimate 
question of whether the Commissioner's denial of the 
application was "contrary to law", i. e. whether it was 
a decision which, under the evidence before him, he could 
not lawfully make. 
Now, how does the Attorney General's earlier opin-
ion of July 26, 1968, bear upon this question 1 That is 
the point to which this reply brief is directed. 
At the outset the form of the question submitted 
by the Commissioner, and to which the opinion of 
July 26 is directed, should be noted (Page 26, Respond-
ent's brief) : 
"May a branch bank be lawfully prohibited 
within the corporate limits of South Ogden, Utah, 
a city of the second class in which no unit bank 
is located, but which is immediately adjacent 
to Ogden City, another city of the second class 
in which are presently located five unit banks, 
where it is shown by the evidence that the pri-
mary objective of the branch bank is not to serve 
South Ogden, in which it is physically to be lo-
cated, but rather to serve Ogden? (Emphasis 
added) 
It is to be noted that the matter of public conven-
ience and advantage was not injected into the question 
as submitted, but that the Commissioner's only concern 
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at that point was whether the branch could be denied 
upon the showing that the objective of the application 
was not to serve South Ogden, but rather to serve 
Ogden where it was prohibited by law from locating. 
The answer of the Attorney General was "yes", the 
application could be denied under the circumstances 
suggested by the question, and in the last paragraph of 
his opinion (Page 29, Respondent's brief) the Attorney 
General gave one basis upon which the denial might 
rest: 
"In Utah, a restrictive policy with respect to 
branch banking has been enunciated. In the 
instant situation, it would not be unreasonable 
for the Bank Commissioner to conclude that the 
subject bank is attempting to invade indirectly an 
area from which it is specifically excluded by 
statute. If such a determination were made, it 
would be entirely appropriate for the conunis-
sioner to thwart the attempted subversion of the 
legislative policy against branch banking in second 
class cities where unit banks exist. He need 
not subscribe to the geographical sophistry prac-
ticed by the applicant, and he may deny the 
application on the simple ground that the public 
convenience and advantage will be subverted 
rather than subserved." 
However, neither this opinion of the Attorney Gen-
eral, or the question upon which it was predicated, pro-
vided the guide lines essential to a decision by the Com-
missioner upon the ultimate objections raised by the 
protestant banks, so a few days later the Commissioner 
submitted a second question to the Attorney General 
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wl1ich resulted in the Opinion of August 15. (Appendix, 
Appellants ' brief, Page VI.) By this second question 
tliP query was directly put as to whether the Commis-
sioner could grant the application upon a finding that 
public convenience and advantage would be served, 
where it was also "shown by the evidence" that the 
primary objective of the proposed branch was not to 
serve South Ogden, where it was to be located, but rather 
to serve Ogden. 
The negative response of the Attorney General 
to this second query has been fully covered in the earlier 
briefs, so we do not further argue it here. The first 
opinion does, however, fully support the thesis of the 
:;;econd point of Appellants' argument as set out in 
their initial brief, namely, that the Commissioner has 
an ultimate discretion in granting or denying branch 
applications, and that in the exercise of this discre-
tion he is entitled to and should take into account 
the factual question of whether the proposed applicat-
ion 1.vould further or would frustrate legislative policy 
as it relates to branch banking. 
This inquiry may have nothing to do with the ques-
tion of public convenience and advantage. The Com-
missioner may find that an area such as Ogden needs 
additional banking facilities, and that those needs could 
be met and the public convenience be served by the 
establishment by Respondent of a branch bank located 
just across the Ogden boundary in South Ogden. How-
ever, the legislature has said that if Ogden needs ad-
ditional banking facilities, such needs are to be served 
by the establishment of independent unit banks, and 
not by branch banks. Accordingly, it would be entirely 
s 
proper and in accordance with law for the Commis-
sioner, notwithstanding his having determined that pub-
lic convenience and advantage would be served through 
the establishment of the proposed branch, to nevertheless 
deny the application upon the ground that serving the 
needs through the establishment of a branch bank would 
not be in accord with legislative policy. Such a decis-
ion, rather than being "not in accordance with law", 
would be entirely lawful and proper. 
Such is the thrust of the Attorney General's opin-
ion of July 26, 1968, as we interpret it. 
We reiterate, accordingly, that such opinion does 
not militate in any way against the lawfulness of the 
Commissioner's decision denying tthe application, or 
support Respondent's contention that the Commis-
sioner's denial of the branch was contrary to law. On 
the contrary it confirms the position Appellants have 
previously taken under point II of their argument, nam-
ely, that even if the patent attempt by the Appellant 
to "invade indirectly an area from which it is specifi-
cally excluded by statute" is not grounds for denying 
the application as a matter of law (as ruled by the 
Attorney General in his second opinion), the Bank Com-
missioner may nevertheless, and should, take that cir-
cumstance into account in the exercise of his discretion-
ary powers, and may thus deny the branch upon the 
ground that to do otherwise would frustrate and negate 
legislative policy. 
True, the Commissioner has not based his decision 
of denial on that ground, as the August 15 opinion of 
the Attorney General foreclosed that opportunity, but 
we may not rule out the possibility that such would be 
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his decision if the op1mon of August 15 is determined 
to be without validity, and the Commissioner is per-
mitted to grant or deny the application upon its mer-
its, rather than pass upon it as a matter of law. 
At any rate, and in any event, this Court, if it holds 
the opinion of the Attorney General to be without valid-
ity, should not itself foreclose the Commissioner of his 
right to decide the case upon its merits, as the lower 
court has done by its peremptory order to the Commis-
sioner to grant the application. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the decision of the lower court 
should be reversed for the several reasons set out in 
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